This article is concerned with some cross-linguistic asymmetries in the use of two types of time metaphors, the Moving-Time and the Moving-Ego metaphor. The latter metaphor appears to be far less well-entrenched in languages such as Croatian or Hungarian, i.e. some of its lexicalizations are less natural than their alternatives based on the MovingTime metaphor, while some others are, unlike their English models, downright unacceptable. It is argued that some of the differences can be related to the status of the fictive motion construction and some restrictions on the choice of verbs in that construction.
Introduction
In the history of contrastive linguistics several, in part complementary, procedures have been used. Researchers relied in some cases on intuitive data (provided by the researcher), just as was done in the beginnings of cognitive linguistics, and still is. Secondly, researchers combined intuition with elicitation, * This work has been fully supported by the Croatian Science Foundation under the project 3624. The authors also received financial support for this research from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, grant FFI2013-43593-P. i.e. they asked native speakers to provide equivalents for the items they were interested in. However, the most widely used procedure in contrastive linguistics at its heyday was translation. We are of course aware of the fact that translation data may contain a certain amount of "noise", i.e. translations may be skewed due to some intrinsic aspects of the translation process, e.g. the parallels between languages may be distorted due to a whole range of reasons, among which stylistic factors may be very important. However, when we eliminate such "nonsystematic" causes of variation, we may be able to observe some interesting correlations.
The initial wave of cross-linguistic work in cognitive linguistics, especially cross-linguistic comparisons in the domain of figurative speech, i.e. metaphor and metonymy, appears to have repeated history in being based primarily on intuition and translation. Data gained through the translation method proved to be a very useful complement to other types of data in cognitive linguistics, bridging the gap between intuition and more empirical sources of data such as corpus-based research, the study of language acquisition, or contrastive and typological research. Naturally, this applies to research on metaphor and other figurative expressions as well.
Not surprisingly, this methodology worked well because early contrastive cognitive linguistic research focused on cross-linguistic similarity, i.e. its intent was to demonstrate the universal character of image schemas, conceptual metaphors and metonymies, etc. Researchers usually concentrated on similarity (i.e. on the universality of the above) rather than contrasts, and when some cross-linguistic differences were discussed they tended to be only isolated contrasts that were, at best, motivated on a one-to-one, ad hoc basis.
Let us now illustrate what the classic translational method might uncover when applied to a cross-linguistic study of conceptual metaphors. As in the case of all figurative expressions, including metaphors, there are three major possibilities when it comes to their translation: Naturally, we are not interested in the translation of non-figurative expressions by non-figurative expressions, so this fourth possibility is not in our table.
Most of the time cross-linguistic comparisons of metaphors or metonymies resulted in contrastive statements of the type: "for a metaphorical/metonymic expression x/type X in language A there is an/no equivalent metaphorical/metonymic expression x/type X in language B". Specifically, a metaphorical expression can be translated by means of an equivalent metaphorical expression (the lower right-hand part of the table) or not (the lower left-hand part of the table). Of course it is also possible for a non-metaphorical expression to be translated by a metaphorical one (the upper right-handed part of the table), but such cases are not very likely to be discovered by a unidirectional contrastive research based on a classic translational method. They would come to the light if we reverse the source and the goal language of the translation, but unless we adopt a bi-directional approach, the cases in the lower left-hand part of the table would fall beneath the radar.
However, there is lot more in the possibility described in the medium heavily shaded part of the table in the lower right hand in terms of contrastive significance than meets the eye. Appearances are deceptive and things are not as simple as they might seem at first blush. As pointed out by LewandowskaTomaszczyk (1987 LewandowskaTomaszczyk ( , 2010 , languages often structure conceptual content in more or less different ways, i.e. asymmetrically, and as a result of this, interlingual translation involves "(re)calibration" aimed at optimisation of conceptual analogousness (cf. Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, 2010: 22) where an expression in one language covers a different portion of conceptual-semantic material than in another language. This applies to the translation of metaphors as well, and can easily be demonstrated. Mandelblit's (1995) Cognitive Translation Hypothesis provides for two possible scenarios in the translation of metaphors. Similar Mapping Condition obtains if no conceptual shift occurs between languages, while in the case of Different Mapping Condition a conceptual shift takes place from source language to target language. In order to check the difference between the two scenarios, Mandelblit (1995: 493) used the time parameter, and concluded that "the difference in reaction time is due to a conceptual shift that the translator is required to make between the conceptual mapping systems of the source and target languages." She has found that metaphorical expressions take more time and are more difficult to translate if they exploit a cognitive domain quite different from that of the target language equivalent expression. This was also confirmed by Tirkkonen-Condit's (2002) study.
But the distance/difference between the two domains need not be immediately clear. As an illustration of the magnitude of the problem of translating metaphors, we just point to an example discussed by Ahrens and Say (1999: 100) . When Liu Tai-ying, the Chairman of the China Development Corp, called George Soros, the international financier, a 'pig', it was necessary for the English-language China News to modify the quote, adding the information that 'a pig is the Mandarin equivalent of an idiot' (China News, October 7, 1998) . Without this information, English readers would interpret the metaphorical expression to mean that Soros is a greedy person, as opposed to the intended meaning of 'a stupid person', which is the entrenched meaning of this metaphor in Chinese. The Hungarian counterpart of pig, disznó, can be used metaphorically to refer to a human with disgusting, unpleasant characteristics. The same applies to Croatian (cf. Milić 2008: 90-91) .
While in the above case the problem is caused by the fact that the same metaphor vehicle belonging to the same source domain is linked to a (slightly) different target domain, the asymmetry or the contrast may be less conspicuous. It is possible for a metaphorical/metonymic expression x/type X in language A to be translated by a metaphorical/metonymic expression y/type Y in language B. In other words, a metaphor vehicle denoting a concept associated with a given source domain may be translated by a different metaphor vehicle associated with a more or less different source domain while the target domain is shared by both languages. In our case, a time metaphor based on a given lexeme x may be translated by (i.e. may be equivalent to) a time metaphor based on a lexeme y that is not directly equivalent to x. As a variation on this theme on a more general level, we note that a time metaphor of the type X, expressed by some lexeme x, may be translated by (i.e. may be equivalent to) a time metaphor of the type Y, expressed by some lexeme y that is not directly equivalent to x. In theory, as a twist on the above, it is also possible that a time metaphor of the type X, expressed by some lexeme x, may be translated by (i.e. may be equivalent to) a time metaphor of the type Y, expressed by a lexeme x that is directly equivalent to x. In other words, it is possible that we have two submetaphors sharing the same source and target domain, and in the limiting case, also sharing the lexical expression (the differences showing in different mappings). In all these case we will end up with a formally asymmetric rendering of the conceptual content.
There is, however, another, subtler dimension of asymmetry that needs to be addressed here. Let us assume that two or more languages (L1, L2, Ln) exhibit two or more submetaphors (sM) related to a more general metaphor (M) such that respective realizations of the submetaphors in question in different languages are apparently direct equivalents of each other (indicated by the symbol ≡ between the cells in the table): Table 2 . The system of equivalent submetaphors across languages.
It is, however, possible that while the submetaphors in question may be structurally, functionally and translationally equivalent, their distribution may be different across languages, i.e. sM1 may be far more frequent than sM2, or sM3 in L1, or more frequent than sM1 in L2 or L3. This means that instead of the seeming equivalence between submetaphors in different languages we should be better advised to assume just approximation. In de Saussurean terms, although two submetaphors, sM1 from L1 and sM2 from L2 may be exact translations and contrastive equivalents of each other, i.e. be perfectly equivalent on a one-to-one basis, outside their metaphorical systems, their value within their respective system is different. What follows in Section 2 is a study on conceptual metaphors of time in a cross-linguistic perspective. More specifically, it is a study on the subsystem of the time motion metaphors with its two submetaphors, the Moving-Time and the Moving-Ego metaphors. After providing some background on these two time metaphors we demonstrate that asymmetric situations of the type discussed above may obtain in the course of translating conceptual metaphors of time from one language into another (and back). A similar type of asymmetry is also found concerning the frequency of the two types of time metaphors in various languages. In Section 3, we consider some factors that may motivate this asymmetry. We first consider whether the two metaphors in question actually have a different status in the sense that one of them is not primary. While Grady (1997a, b) considers them to be primary metaphors, Evans (2003) argues that they are both complex metaphorical models. The differences are attributed in part to different cultural models of proactivity or passivity, but also to semantic clash brought about by not adhering to the folk model of time and its default assignment of roles of Figure and Ground in the Moving Ego metaphor. The same counterintuitive assignment of these two roles is observed in the fictive motion construction of the coextension path type, which is the mirror image of the Moving Time metaphor, which means that there is a correlation between the lower frequency of the Moving Ego, on the one hand, and the constraints on the fictive motion construction, on the other, as corroborated by Japanese, Croatian, Hungarian and German data. McGinley, "Ballad of Lost Objects") as well as motion (TIME IS MOTION), etc. According to the relevant static or dynamic reference point metaphorical models of time can be classified as Ego-Reference-Point models (where the Ego's location is the "now"), or as Time-Reference-Point models (where earlier event are in front of later events the Reference Point (cf. Núñez and Sweetser, 2006; Moore, 2014) .
Time metaphors
When it comes to the Ego-Reference-Point models, it is usual to draw a distinction between Moving-Time and Moving-Ego metaphors (Clark, 1973; Gentner, 2001; Evans, 2003; Johnson, 1980, 1999; Traugott, 1978) . We make use of the former when we conceptualize time events as moving with respect to a fixed observer from front (future) to back (past) as in: (1) Christmas is approaching. (2) Holidays are coming. (3) New Year is coming to us soon. (4) Time passes so quickly. (5) The summer went by.
Time is viewed here as an object moving with respect to the observer, and the metaphor can be fully spelled out as TIME PASSING IS MOTION OF AN OBJECT. The latter metaphor is exemplified by:
(6) We are approaching Christmas. (7) … we are coming to holidays and we have more traffic to deal with... (8) As we are getting closer to the end of the year… (9) Those sad days are behind us. (10) Thanksgiving is looming on the horizon.
In this subtype the observer moves forward towards fixed (future) time events, fully spelled as TIME PASSING IS AN OBSERVER'S MOTION OVER A LANDSCAPE. In an informal translation task 20 MA students majoring in English at the University of Osijek (either 2 nd or 3 rd year), whose mother tongue is Croatian, were asked to provide a most natural sounding translation of the following text:
(11a) Loyal supporters of Nourish, Creaseys Chartered Accountants of Lonsdale Gardens, Tunbridge Wells recently supplemented their monthly donation with the thoughtful addition of Easter Eggs. As Assistant Client Manager Louise Tunstall explained: "As we were approaching Easter it occurred to us that many local families would not be able to afford Easter Eggs so we asked everyone here whether they would like to donate some kind of Easter treat as well as the usual food items. Everyone was really enthusiastic about the idea and we ended up with a really good collection.
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The students, who had taken no cognitive linguistics course and were therefore unlikely to know anything about the way cognitive linguistic approach conceptual metaphors, let alone anything about metaphors of time, were told that this task formed part of a wider research on translation practice. Our focus of attention was an adverbial clause in the middle of the text in which time was construed metaphorically, viz. As we were approaching Easter. The majority of students, i.e. 16 out of 20, did not provide a translation that follows the original as closely as possible. They changed the role of the Croatian equivalent of Easter, Uskrs, in their translations, promoting it to the subject of the corresponding adverbial clause:
(11b) Kako se približava Uskrs,... 'As Easter is approaching'
The rest, i.e. 4 students, followed in their translations the original as closely as possible:
(11c) Kako smo se približavali Uskrsu 'As we were approaching Easter'
When another group of 10 students were asked to translate (11b) back into English, none of the respondents provided the original, As we were approaching Easter, but only As Easter is approaching/getting nearer, etc. This means that our translators exhibited an interesting pattern -although two variants are in theory available in both languages, offering the possibility of pairing them in a 1:1 way, they clearly preferred the variant in which time is moving metaphorically in both languages. In other words, they produced an asymmetric situation in the sense of Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (1987 , 2010 . Grady (1997b: 119) allows (though reluctantly) both of these metaphors to be primary ones. Recognizing them as primary also means that they are very likely to be universal, i.e. they are to be found in very many languages (Grady, 1997a: 228) . Moore (2010: 87) notes that … the Moving Ego and Moving Time metaphors have been observed in various unrelated languages around the world, and according to conceptual metaphor theory, part of the explanation for this type of widespread crosslinguistic commonality is that the experiential basis of the metaphor is available in all of the relevant cultures around the world. Moore (2014: 13) states that "Moving Ego and Ego-centered Moving Time occur repeatedly -with the same inference patterns -in language after language around the world," but only gives examples from various languages for the latter.
However, according to Sinha et al. (2011) , both Moving-Time and MovingEgo metaphors are lacking in Amondawa. Note also that Núñez and Sweetser (2006) show that Aymara, an Amerindian language spoken in the Andean highlands of Bolivia, Peru and Chile, does not have dynamic models of time. The Aymara language instead has a major static model of time wherein FUTURE IS BEHIND EGO and PAST IS IN FRONT OF EGO.
But even if these submetaphors were primary, and nearly universal, the question is whether they are equally natural and/or frequent in all languages. Gentner, Imai & Boroditsky (2002) report a number of interesting observations. They found that their subjects took longer to respond to items that used the Moving-Time metaphor than to those that used the Moving-Ego metaphor. In one of their experiments they observed spontaneous conversion from the Moving-Time to the Moving-Ego metaphor; such conversions never occurred in the reverse direction. Similarly, Huang & Hsieh (2007) report that Chinese speakers when tested in their native tongue, process Moving-Ego metaphors faster. But when the same subjects were tested in English (as L2), they conceptualized Moving-Time metaphors much better. Both of these studies seem to suggest that the Moving-Ego metaphor is somehow easier or more natural for English.
Unsurprisingly, both submetaphors are attested in a range of languages, and this can be easily verified by translating some of the above examples from English. Cf. first some examples from Croatian: (12a) On top of that, there are also clear differences in the frequency of the use of the two metaphors, the expressions of the Moving-Ego being quite rare, to say the least, which is in complete agreement with the asymmetry in the translation task above: It is often pointed out in the literature that examples with ahead can be ambiguous between the two models. The Croatian preposition pred 'before, in front of' might be claimed to be similar to ahead in this respect, but note that "Nova godina je pred/Nova je godina pred", the more frequent construction, is more likely to be interpreted as exemplifying the Moving Time metaphor. It is also interesting to add that the New Year's Eve party is rendered in Croatian by means of the nominalization doček Nove godine, which literally means 'welcome of New Year,' making it clear that it is the new Year that is conceptualized as moving and coming to us, and not the other way round. In short, sentences such as (12a:b) and (12b:b) are acceptable as translations, i.e. they are structurally and functionally equivalent to their English models, but they are not of the same weight as their English models. There does not obtain statistical equivalence between them in the sense of Krzeszowski (1991) .
5 They are not natural choices and certainly sound more marked than (12a:a) and 3 Exact Google queries were performed in which quotation marks were used as operators forcing Google to return only the exact matches of what is enclosed within them. 4 This is a web corpus collected from the .hr top-level domain. The current version of the corpus (v2.0) contains 1.9 billion tokens and is annotated with the lemma, morphosyntax and dependency syntax layers (Ljubešić and Klubička, 2014) .
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Among several types of equivalence that Krzeszowski (1991) discusses, we also find statistical equivalence. He claims that this sort of equivalence obtains between elements that have "maximally similar frequencies of occurrence" in their respective 2-text corpora in addition to semantic and/or formal similarity or equivalence (1991: 27).
(12b:a). It is therefore not surprising that the Moving-Ego metaphor is often replaced in translation by the Moving-Time metaphor.
Hungarian is in this respect very similar to Croatian. More or less literal translations of the English examples (1) and (6) are acceptable, as shown by (14) a. and b., respectively (cf. also Kövecses, 2005: 52) : (14) a Although we have so far assumed that the two metaphors are statistically speaking on equal footing in English, this is not borne out by a Google query, as can be seen in Table 6 below. Although they do not treat explicitly Moving-Ego metaphors as such in their corpus study Schmidt and Omazić (2011) "we are coming up to Christmas" 7,500,000/120
As far as English is concerned, these results seem to be in keeping with Radden (2011: 32) , who lists Google hits for similar examples in English, Chinese and Japanese: (19) a. shimekiri-ga chikadsuite-ki-ta deadline-NOM come closer-come-PST "The deadline is coming closer." b. ?shimekiri-ni chikadsuite-ki-ta deadline-OBL come closer-come-PST (20) a. 3-nen-no tsukihi-ga nagare-ta 3-year-GEN years-NOM flow-PST "Three years have passed." b. *3-nen-no tsukihi-ni nagare-ta 3-year-GEN year-OBL flow-PST
In general, Suzuki (2015) finds that the Moving Time metaphor is more frequent in Japanese than the Moving Ego. Romanian is apparently similar to Croatian, Hungarian, German, English, and Japanese, showing the same sort of asymmetry: (21) a. Tiptil, Crăciunul se apropie. 'Slowly, Christmas is approaching' b. Desi ne apropiem de Craciun,... 'Although we are slowly approaching Christmas' lit. I'm approaching fifty, 'I'm almost fifty'
Motivating the asymmetries and contrasts
In a search for an explanation of the asymmetries observed in a number of languages concerning the distribution of the two types of time metaphors as well as for the contrasts between languages concerning the frequency of a given type of metaphor one could start from several points of departure. It could be assumed, for one thing, that the observed cross-linguistic differences and similarities may have to do with a different status of the two metaphors in question.
Recall that we mentioned that Grady (1997b: 119) takes both of these metaphors to be primary ones. However, we might suppose that the crosslinguistically less frequent type of two metaphors, viz. the Moving Ego, is actually not a primary metaphor, but a complex one, and that some of its various component parts somehow more or less do not agree with or fit into the larger figurative system of these languages. After all, as pointed out by Kövecses (2005: 4) , primary metaphors are likely to be universal, while the complex ones are more likely to be language-specific. Evans (2013: 243) , however, casts doubts on the status of both the Moving Ego and the Moving Time metaphor as primary ones. He claims that these metaphors … actually amount to what Grady refers to as complex metaphors -they are not comprised of phenomenologically simple facets of embodied experience. (Evans 2013: 244) Evans (2004: 212) goes on to claim that these are culturally constructed complex cognitive models, i.e. they "consist of independently-motivated sets of temporal lexical concepts, and the elaborations associated with this range of concepts."
Now it turns out that, regardless of whether Grady or Evans is right, the two metaphors are intrinsically no different from each other concerning their status, i.e. that it is not the case that one of them is primary and the other compound, we need to check whether there may be some elements of these two cognitive models that inhibit one and/or facilitate the other.
It transpires from the above data that the distribution of the time metaphors is different in different languages. In fact, experimental studies show that there is a lot of variation among speakers belonging to a single linguistic community. In some studies it was shown that it is possible to manipulate speakers, i.e. prime them in certain ways so as to produce utterances illustrating with one or the other metaphor. Margolies and Crawford (2008) examined whether affect might influence the choice between the two time metaphors under study here, i.e. whether positive and negative events are associated with different time metaphors. The results of their experiments show that participants who imagined a negative event were more likely to report that the event was approaching them, whereas those who imagined a positive event were more likely to report that they were approaching the event. Experiments also indicated that participants judge an event to be more positive if it is described from the ego-moving perspective than if it were described from the time-moving perspective. Richmond, Wilson and Zinken (2012) report that participants who adopt an ego-moving representation exhibit significantly higher agency scores and significantly higher future time perspective scores than those with time-moving perspective. Participants adopting a time-moving representation reported significantly higher present fatalistic scores as well as significantly higher present hedonistic scores than participants with an ego-moving representation. Their study also shows that participants with an ego-moving representation reported significantly higher scores for happiness than those with time-moving representations. The latter reported significantly higher state and trait anxiety scores and depression scores than participants who indicated an ego-moving representation. What is more, Richmond, Wilson and Zinken (2012) argue that our representation of time is a fairly malleable, bidirectional relation obtaining between time representation and emotional experiences in the sense that manipulating the former has an effect on the latter and vice versa.
In a similar study, Duffy and Feist (2014) concentrate on how lifestyle and personality factors in two groups of participants with very different expectations concerning their structuring of time (university students in one group, and university administrators in the other) may influence the choice between the two perspectives, i.e. whether one is more likely to use a Moving-Time or a MovingEgo metaphor. University students more frequently adopted the Moving-Ego perspective, while the opposite was true of administrators. Their experimental data also show that there is a correlation between adopting a Moving-Ego perspective and higher procrastination scores on the one hand, and lower conscientiousness scores on the other. Participants adopting this perspective also evidence higher levels of extroversion than those adopting the Moving-Time perspective.
These studies appear to invite us to draw a number of (sometimes conflicting) conclusions. Some of them suggest that there are some more permanent factors that might influence the choice across the population. Generalizing from this, we might assume that the differences we have observed above simply reflect differences between cultural-linguistic communities in the sense that in a given society hedonism, procrastination, active lifestyle, egotism, etc. may be more prevalent than in some other societies. Radden (2003: 237) argues that Moving Ego model, implying static time, is inconsistent with our folk view of moving time. Neagu (2008: 144) links the small number of linguistic realizations of the Moving Ego metaphor in Romanian to a more passivity-oriented attitude to time and life in general. The Japanese situation, as described in Suzuki (2015) , may be linked to such cultural model of proactivity or passivity. This is very similar to what was observed in Schmidt and Brdar (2012) , where the conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A GAMBLING GAME was found to be frequently used in English, Croatian and Hungarian, but its lexicalization forms differed across languages. Gambling is a heterogeneous phenomenon including a broad range of activities, ranging from betting to card games such as poker, to lottery and bingo. Generally, these can be roughly divided into two large groups: active (cards and betting) and passive gambling (like tickets and lottery). The wording of their metaphors reveals that Croats and Hungarians are obviously fond of passive gambling, while English seems to be more in favour of using active gambling metaphors.
But there are also seem to be some structural correlates that may help complete the picture. Radden (2011: 29, fn 22) notes that:
Like many scholars, Lakoff and Johnson (1999) do not distinguish between static and truly motional terms and include under their moving observer metaphor cases such as Will you be staying a long time or a short time? and He'll have his degree within two years, which are static situations whose duration may be conceived of in terms of fictive motion.
The close links between time metaphors and fictive motion are also suggested in Boroditsky (2000) , Boroditsky and Ramscar (2002) , and Matlock, Ramscar and Boroditsky (2005) . It has been shown (Boroditsky 2000) that in neutral contexts people answer ambiguous time questions from ego-and time-moving perspectives equally often, but that it is possible to entice speakers to assume either the ego-or the time-moving perspective by giving them a task with either imaginary or real manipulation of objects in space. Boroditsky and Ramscar (2002) showed that subjects primed to think of objects coming toward them through space were more likely to think of time as coming toward them, i.e. more likely to use the Moving-Time metaphor. On the other hand, subjects primed to think of themselves as moving through space showed the opposite pattern. They found that actual spatial motion is neither necessary nor sufficient to influence people's thinking about time. Rather, it is thinking about spatial motion that seems to underlie thinking about time. In a follow-up study, Matlock, Ramscar and Boroditsky (2005) demonstrate that engaging in thought about abstract motion can encourage people to take an ego-moving perspective, which in turn, encourages them to "move" forward through time.
The phenomenon of fictive motion was first applied by Talmy (1983 Talmy ( , 1996 Talmy ( , 2000 to descriptions in which settings that are factively stationary are construed as moving. Among the many subtypes of fictive motion, such as Emanation Paths (which can be Orientation paths (23) The light is shining (from the sun) into the cave/onto the back wall of the cave c.
The pillar cast/projected a shadow onto/against the wall.
(24) I sat in the car and watched the scenery rush past me.
(25) Termite mounds are scattered/spread/distributed all over the plain.
(26) a. The path runs along the beach. b. The beach runs along the town before coming to a disused harbour made up of a long sweeping seawall and many rockpools inside. McGlone and Harding (1998: 1211) (27) a. He was rushing toward the brick wall (as he realized that his brakes had failed). b. The brick wall was rushing toward him (as he realized that his brakes had failed).
(28) a. We are fast approaching the end of the semester. b. The end of the semester is fast approaching.
In addition to this analogy, we should also note a sort of cross-matching between (27) b. and (28) a.; the wall, i.e. the Ground-turned- Figure, is factively static, but is construed as moving, while the observer, we, is construed as moving instead of time, Figure- turned-Ground. Both of these run contrary to common-sense folk models. Matsumoto (1998) reports that not all objects can be described by a fictive motion expression in Japanese. Unlike in English, nontravellable paths, that is, paths which cannot be travelled by humans, such as walls and fences, cannot be used in Japanese fictive motion constructions. This means that there is a sort of correlation between Moving Ego and fictive motion, both being subject to restrictions. In other words, we might expect that other languages that exhibit a pronounced asymmetry in the use of time metaphors, favouring the Moving Time type, might also exhibit similar constraints concerning the use of fictive motion construction.
Let us now consider how some examples of prototypical fictive motion constructions are rendered in Croatian: 'the beach stretches/extends from Viareggio in the south to the border ot Liguria,…' e. Plaža se prostire od ulaza u Shallow Inlet to malog naselja u Zaljevu Warath, na desnom kraju plaže. Lit. 'the beach stretches/extends from the Shallow Inlet entrance to the small settlement of Waratah Bay, at the western end of the beach'
It turns out that in the case of coextension path type of fictive motion constructions in Croatian, virtually all dynamic construals of a situation based on verbs that are counterparts of verbs like run, move, etc. are not acceptable. Instead we find verbs denoting slow movement like ići 'go', voditi 'lead/guide', change of direction such as skretati 'turn', or verbs denoting no movement but denoting rather static situations like spanning, such as prostirati / pružati/ protezati se 'extend /stretch/ spread (itself).' Notice that the English counterparts of these verbs, extend and stretch, can also be used in such contexts, though in some cases the meaning of the whole might be slightly different. Notably, they are possible in contexts like (29) b., d. and e., but they are nevertheless used considerably less frequently than lead or run, which are felt to be more idiomatic. This means that when translating sentences like (30) d. and e. into English we can expect, depending on the experience and skill of the translator, more or less correct translations resulting in the overuse of extend or stretch and, conversely, the underuse of run, which would be more natural choice, and statistically speaking more frequent one. In other words, instead of an asymmetry obtaining in the case of translating from English into Croatian, while we would have its levelling in the case of translating from Croatian into English. The constraints observed are similar to what Suzuki reports for English and Japanese, which means that Croatian and Japanese again exhibit the same tendency. However, on the basis of the examples like (30) above, and (31) below, there also appear to be are some differences between Croatian and Japanese: (31) a. Zapadno od Bola, pruža se/*vodi/*ide/**trči plaža Zlatni rat... 'West of Bol there extends/*leads/*goes/runs the Golden Horn beach' b. Plaža se proteže 4 kilometra duž obale... 'The beach stretches for 4 kilometres along the coast'
Apart from subjects, i.e. moving Ground-turned-Figures, denoting items whose primary function is transport (the travellable ones), verbs of slow movement are also compatible with non-travellable but traversable, elongated locative objects, such as fences, gates. The most static verbs of the extend type are found with locative objects that are neither travellable nor traversable. The same seems to be true for Hungarian (32), and German (33) At the moment we can only speculate about the reason for these constraints and more research is necessary, on more languages and based on more data. One of the possible reasons could be the semantic clash between a dynamic motion verb and the Ground-turned- Figure. We could say that the clash is removed in Croatian, Hungarian and German, where static verbs of the extend-type are used instead of a dynamic one. The semantic clash is not so open in English due to the fact that dynamic verbs such as run or go exhibit a great deal of polysemy. They can serve grammatical functions, i.e. they can be used as resultative copula verbs, go can be used for future time reference (going to), as well as in many well-entrenched collocations, with these verbs having a near grammatical role (e.g. run danger / risk / test / business, etc.).
Concluding remarks
In the introductory section, we stated that the data gained through the translation method can be a very useful complement to other types of data in cognitive linguistics, bridging the gap between intuition and some more empirical sources of data. Naturally, this applies to the research on metaphor as well. Combining translation with the contrastive approach may help uncover not only the conditions of their use at the token level, but also patterns of their use in the cultural and discoursal context. We demonstrated this by taking a very close look at some cross-linguistic asymmetries in the use of two types of time metaphors, the Moving-Time and the Moving-Ego metaphor in a number of languages, such as English, German, Croatian, Hungarian, and Romanian. The Moving-Ego metaphor appears to be far less frequently used in languages such as Croatian or Hungarian, i.e. some of its lexicalizations are less natural than their counterparts based on the MovingTime metaphor, while some others are, unlike their English counterparts, clearly unacceptable.
The differences are attributed in part to different cultural models of proactivity or passivity, but also to semantic clash brought about by not adhering to the folk model of time and its default assignment of roles of Figure and Ground in the Moving Ego metaphor. The same counterintuitive assignment of these two roles is observed in the fictive motion construction of the coextension path type, which is the mirror image of the Moving Time metaphor, which means that there is a correlation between the lower frequency of the Moving Ego, on the one hand, and the constraints on the fictive motion construction, on the other, as corroborated by Japanese, Croatian, Hungarian and German data.
